Amy Kim's Defense of Harry S. Truman's Bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima
Argument 1. The bomb was never intended to be used against civilians
Evidence 1. Harry S. Truman wanted to target soldiers.
Harry S. Truman, Diary, July 25, 1945
This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.
Argument 2. The Americans did not wantthousands of U.S Army and Navy to be killed in an invasion of Japan.
Evidence 1. That the Japanese could have cost the U.S. troops many deaths based on evidence of other island invasions.
The invasion of Iwo proved extremely costly: 6,200 U.S. Marines died on that small island that was so valuable as an airbase for B-29s involved in the bombing of Japan. Some of the bombers that were unable to make their runs or upon return were crippled by antiaircraft or other damage or mechanical failures, were able to land there.
Evidence 2. That the Japanese could have cost the U.S. troops many deaths based on evidence of other island invasions.
The American preponderance over the Japanese defenders at Iwo Jima was four to one. The invasion of the large island of Okinawa, which was 350 miles south of the southernmost home island of Kyushu, proved twice as costly: 13,000 died, one-third of them aboard ship as a result of the dozens of kamikaze attacks. The pilots of these outmoded planes, which often had no ability to get back to their bases, sacrificed themselves and their planes as bombs. In the single most costly kamikaze attack (on the big carrier U.S.S. Franklin), the cost in U.S. deaths was 1,000 men, and the attack turned the ship into a flaming near-wreck, useless for any further campaigns.
Evidence. 3 The Japanese could have cost the U.S. troops about 25,000 to 46,000 soldiers.
By mid-June American military leaders were becoming fearful of what their military services might be up against, and calculations of a tentative sort were made, all of them frightful in their implications. A joint war plans committee, army and navy, came up with an estimate that 25,000 men would be killed in an invasion of Kyushu on two fronts; 40,000 might die if an invasion on a single front was followed by invasion of the island of Honshu, on which Tokyo was located; and 46,000 deaths were estimated as a result of a two-front invasion of Kyushu followed by an invasion of Honshu.
“Introduction: Truman and the Bomb, a Documentary History.” 27 Apr 2009 <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/ferrell_book/ferrell_book_intro.htm>.
Evidence. 3 If there had been an invasion, the U.S. were outnumbered
And there was another figure that needed to be taken into consideration: the Japanese troop strength on Kyushu. In the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa the U.S. forces always had had a preponderance, respectively four times to one and two and one-half times to one. In mid-June General Marshall had estimated Japanese strength on Kyushu at 350,000. By July 24 he was saying 500,000, and by August 6 his figure rose to 560,000. He was drawing these figures from the analysis by intelligence of Japanese radio traffic, an operation known as Ultra. What he did not know was that Ultra's estimates were unduly low and that by August 6 the Japanese force on Kyushu had reached 900,000. The invasion of Kyushu was scheduled for November 1, and by that date Japanese troop strength on Kyushu could well have been over 1 million, which meant that U.S. invasion forces would be heavily outnumbered.
On Aug. 9, after Nagasaki was a-bombed, Truman made another public statement on why the atomic bombs were used: "Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans."
("Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman, 1945", pg. 212).
Argument 3. A demonstration would not have worked...
Regarding a possible demonstration, we only had two atom bombs at the time and it would have taken many months to manufacture more. Should a demonstration not worked, we would have been down to one. If that did not work, we would have had to continue the war for some time while we readied more bombs. Of course, the next step in the war was the invasion of their main island. It is estimated that it would have cost 500,000 lives to do so.
Argument 4. Containing the Island would not have worked...
Containing the Island would have only resulted in starving millions of Japanese...the military always gets the first supplies. And it wasn't Hirihito that was holding out, but the military leaders, who were actually running the country. Also, the American people would never have stood for sitting and waiting another year or two, for Japan to surrender.
Argument 5. We needed to create an impact....
It was the "shock and awe" to use a modern term that shook the Japanese into the reality that their cause was lost and their emperor may actually have it wrong - remember he was treated as if and was thought as a god by the Japanese people.
Amy Kim's Defense of Harry S. Truman's Bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima
Argument 1. The bomb was never intended to be used against civilians
Evidence 1. Harry S. Truman wanted to target soldiers.
Harry S. Truman, Diary, July 25, 1945
This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.“Atomic Bomb: Decision -- Truman Diary, July 25, 1945.” 27 Apr 2009 <http://www.dannen.com/decision/hst-jl25.html>.
Argument 2. The Americans did not want thousands of U.S Army and Navy to be killed in an invasion of Japan.
Evidence 1. That the Japanese could have cost the U.S. troops many deaths based on evidence of other island invasions.
The invasion of Iwo proved extremely costly: 6,200 U.S. Marines died on that small island that was so valuable as an airbase for B-29s involved in the bombing of Japan. Some of the bombers that were unable to make their runs or upon return were crippled by antiaircraft or other damage or mechanical failures, were able to land there.Evidence 2. That the Japanese could have cost the U.S. troops many deaths based on evidence of other island invasions.
The American preponderance over the Japanese defenders at Iwo Jima was four to one. The invasion of the large island of Okinawa, which was 350 miles south of the southernmost home island of Kyushu, proved twice as costly: 13,000 died, one-third of them aboard ship as a result of the dozens of kamikaze attacks. The pilots of these outmoded planes, which often had no ability to get back to their bases, sacrificed themselves and their planes as bombs. In the single most costly kamikaze attack (on the big carrier U.S.S. Franklin), the cost in U.S. deaths was 1,000 men, and the attack turned the ship into a flaming near-wreck, useless for any further campaigns.Evidence. 3 The Japanese could have cost the U.S. troops about 25,000 to 46,000 soldiers.
By mid-June American military leaders were becoming fearful of what their military services might be up against, and calculations of a tentative sort were made, all of them frightful in their implications. A joint war plans committee, army and navy, came up with an estimate that 25,000 men would be killed in an invasion of Kyushu on two fronts; 40,000 might die if an invasion on a single front was followed by invasion of the island of Honshu, on which Tokyo was located; and 46,000 deaths were estimated as a result of a two-front invasion of Kyushu followed by an invasion of Honshu.“Introduction: Truman and the Bomb, a Documentary History.” 27 Apr 2009 <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/ferrell_book/ferrell_book_intro.htm>.
Evidence. 3 If there had been an invasion, the U.S. were outnumbered
And there was another figure that needed to be taken into consideration: the Japanese troop strength on Kyushu. In the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa the U.S. forces always had had a preponderance, respectively four times to one and two and one-half times to one. In mid-June General Marshall had estimated Japanese strength on Kyushu at 350,000. By July 24 he was saying 500,000, and by August 6 his figure rose to 560,000. He was drawing these figures from the analysis by intelligence of Japanese radio traffic, an operation known as Ultra. What he did not know was that Ultra's estimates were unduly low and that by August 6 the Japanese force on Kyushu had reached 900,000. The invasion of Kyushu was scheduled for November 1, and by that date Japanese troop strength on Kyushu could well have been over 1 million, which meant that U.S. invasion forces would be heavily outnumbered.“Introduction: Truman and the Bomb, a Documentary History.” 28 Apr 2009 <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/ferrell_book/ferrell_book_intro.htm>.
Argument 3. According to the President....
Evidence 1. The bomb was justified.
On Aug. 9, after Nagasaki was a-bombed, Truman made another public statement on why the atomic bombs were used:"Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans."
("Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman, 1945", pg. 212).
Argument 3. A demonstration would not have worked...
Regarding a possible demonstration, we only had two atom bombs at the time and it would have taken many months to manufacture more. Should a demonstration not worked, we would have been down to one. If that did not work, we would have had to continue the war for some time while we readied more bombs. Of course, the next step in the war was the invasion of their main island. It is estimated that it would have cost 500,000 lives to do so.Argument 4. Containing the Island would not have worked...
Containing the Island would have only resulted in starving millions of Japanese...the military always gets the first supplies. And it wasn't Hirihito that was holding out, but the military leaders, who were actually running the country. Also, the American people would never have stood for sitting and waiting another year or two, for Japan to surrender.Argument 5. We needed to create an impact....
It was the "shock and awe" to use a modern term that shook the Japanese into the reality that their cause was lost and their emperor may actually have it wrong - remember he was treated as if and was thought as a god by the Japanese people.-kamikaze
-always follows their Emperor (God)